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richer framework that may help to accommodate selection of emigrants and return migrants 
that are not immediately compatible with the one-dimensional skill model. Our analysis also 
has  implications  for  the  debate  on  brain  drain  and  brain  gain.  In  the  two  skills  model 
presented here, return migration can lead to a mitigation of the brain drain, or even the 
creation of a "brain gain", where those who return bring the home country augmented local 
skills. 
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Abstract
In this paper we present a model that explains migrations as decisions that
respond to where human capital can be acquired more e¢ ciently, and where the
return to human capital is highest. The basic framework is a dynamic Roy model
in which a worker possesses two distinct skills that can be augmented by learning
by doing. There are di⁄erent implicit prices, in di⁄erent countries and di⁄erent
rates of skill accumulation. Our analysis contributes to the literature on the
selection of immigrants and return migrants by o⁄ering a richer framework that
may help to accommodate selection of emigrants and return migrants that are
not immediately compatible with the one-dimensional skill model. Our analysis
also has implications for the debate on brain drain and brain gain. In the two
skills model presented here, return migration can lead to a mitigation of the
brain drain, or even the creation of a "brain gain", where those who return
bring the home country augmented local skills.
Key Words: Return migration, human capital accumulation, comparative ad-
vantage, brain drain
JEL Classi￿cation: J3, J6, F2.
1 Introduction
Mobility of workers across national borders responds not only to the return to
skills, but also to the opportunity and e¢ ciency of skill acquisition. E¢ ciency
considerations suggest that skills should be acquired where the cost is low and
applied where the reward is high. This last aspect has been largely overlooked
in the literature that analyzes the causes and forms of migration. Thus, indi-
viduals may choose to acquire skills abroad that are highly rewarded in their
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1home country and produced cheaply elsewhere. Student migrations are an ex-
ample with some countries having established themselves as learning centers
that provide educational services above those demanded domestically.1
There is evidence that, for migrants who returned to their home country,
work experience acquired abroad enhances earnings by more than work experi-
ence acquired in the home country. Reinhold and Thom (2009) analyze earnings
of Mexican emigrants who returned from the U.S. They ￿nd that, for these im-
migrants, the labor market experience accumulated in the US increases earnings
by twice the amount than experience accumulated in Mexico. Papers by Barret
and O￿ Connel (2000), Barret and Goggin (2010) and Lara (2006) report simi-
lar ￿ndings for Ireland and for migrants who returned to Eastern Europe from
Western European countries. Co, Gang and Yun (2000) report a wage premium
for having been abroad for female return migrants to Hungary.2
In this paper, we present a model that explains migrations as decisions that
respond to where human capital can be acquired more e¢ ciently and where
the return to human capital is highest. The basic framework is one in which a
worker possesses two distinct skills that can be augmented by learning by doing
while acquiring work experience. The two skills command a di⁄erent implicit
price in di⁄erent countries. The rate of human capital accumulation is also
di⁄erent in di⁄erent countries. Thus, a person may move to a country where
her skills grow fast and then apply these skills in a di⁄erent country where these
skills have a high price. In this regard, there is an important di⁄erence between
human and physical or ￿nancial assets. Human capital cannot be separated
from its owner and he/she must move in order to exploit di⁄erences in returns
in di⁄erent locations.
An early paper that discusses higher return in the home country to skills
acquired in the host country as a motive that triggers return migration is Dust-
mann (1994, 1995). Other papers that analyze this motive are Borjas and Brats-
berg (1996), Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003), De Coulon and Piracha (2005),
and Mayr and Peri (2008). These models assume that individual skills are one-
dimensional. In the single skill model, individuals move based on the prices
of this skill in the two countries. If the price is higher in the receiving coun-
1Recent papers that discuss movement of students are Rosenzweig (2008) who discusses
international mobility and Kennan (2009 ) who examines mobility across US states. Rosen-
zweig (2008), provides evidence on learning centers. He reports that of the 2 million tertiary
students enrolled in education as foreign students, 80% were educated in only ￿ve countries:
The US, the UK, Australia, Japan, and Germany.
2Return migration is an important phenomenon. Of the foreign born population that
entered the UK in the 1990￿ s, and stayed for at least one year, about 40% had left the UK
after another 5 years (see Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). Bijwaard (2008) reports that of those
arriving to the Netherlands, about 40% have left the country within seven years. Christophe
and G. Spielvogel (2008) report similar out-migration rates for other countries. The average
out-migration rate after 5 years ranges from 28% for the Netherlands to 60% for Ireland. Of
those immigrants from Mexico who resided in the US in 1995, 3.7 percent had returned in 2000.
Return rates di⁄er across education groups: While only 1.6% of those with an intermediate
level of education had returned, 4.3% and 5% of the low and highly educated returned. Similar
U-shaped patterns for return apply to migration from the US to Argentina and Brazil and
from Spain to Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
2try some highly skilled workers will move. If the possibility to learn abroad is
added, some of those who moved will return but those will be the least skilled
among the emigrants. Conversely, if the price of the single skill is lower abroad,
low skilled workers will emigrate and among these immigrants the most skilled
will return.3
Considering two skills and allowing comparative advantage to play a role, we
obtain "non-hierarchical" migration and remigration patterns with movements
that are neither positively nor negatively selected. Among the stayers in the
home country, there are some who are more able (in the sense of having a larger
endowment of both skills) than some of the movers. At the same time, there
may be some movers who are more skilled than some of the stayers. In both
comparisons, those who stay have a relatively high component of the skill that
is more highly valued in the home country and those who move have a relatively
high component of the skill that is more highly valued in the host country. By
the same logic, the selection of return migrants may exacerbate or alleviate the
impact of migrant selection for the initial out-migration for both emigration- and
immigration country. In these regards, the multi-dimensional skill distribution
yields a richer set of testable implications than the one skill model of Borjas
and Bratsberg (1996).
Our model has important implications for the debate on brain drain and
brain gain. In an early paper, Kwok and Leland (1982) describe brain drain
as a (permanent) out￿ ow of skilled workers. The model discussed by Borjas
and Bratsberg (1996) adds an additional dimension to this: A brain drain issue
arises when the price of skills is higher abroad, and may be ampli￿ed by those
who return being the less able among those who left. In the two skills model
presented here, the brain drain is mitigated because those who return come
with augmented local skills that are more applicable in the home country. If
the proportion of those who return is large enough, aggregate output and even
output per capita may increase, implying a brain gain. We also show that by
imposing entry standards based on skills that are tailored to the host country
the potential brain gain is reduced, because some of those who would return
with augmented local skills are barred from skill acquisition abroad.4
We discuss these issues in the context of a dynamic Roy model, in which skills
vary over time. In contrast to the static Roy model, in which alternatives are
characterized by the prices of skills only, our model speci￿es each alternative in
terms of its price and learning opportunities. Such a model can generate planned
3Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) assume that learning abroad raises local earning by a ￿xed
proportion, irrespective of the duration of the stay abroad. Stark et al. (1998) present a
model with employers￿learning, which may lead to return migration of those immigrants who
were found to be less productive. In Borjas and Bratsberg￿ s framework, this is captured by
shocks to earnings after emigration.
4Several studies suggest that entry restrictions based on skill in the receiving countries
provide an incentive to invest in human capital in the source county (see Mountford, 1997,
Docquier and Rapoport, 1997, Stark et al., 1998, and Vidal, 1998). This may then mitigate
the brain drain, or even turn it into a brain gain (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, Mayr
and Peri, 2008).
3mobility even under conditions of certainty.5 This richer framework is suited to
explain migration and remigration between countries with di⁄erent technologies
and a di⁄erent industrial structure. In particular, it can explain immigration
patterns between developed and developing countries that are incompatible with
the one skill model that is often applied empirically.6
We conduct the analysis in three steps, working backwards. We ￿rst examine
the return decision of immigrants who are already in the receiving country and
investigate who shall return to the home country and when. Based on the results
of this last stage, we examine the timing of emigration from the home country.
Based on these two considerations, we ￿nally discuss who shall emigrate. We
show that these decisions depend crucially on the extent of transferability of
work experience acquired abroad to the home country. Speci￿cally, if one can
augment the skills that are highly valued in the home country more e¢ ciently
abroad, it motivates both emigration and return migration. We then discuss
the potential brain gain associated with return migration.
2 Earning, Learning and Prices
2.1 Skills and human capital
Human capital is viewed here as an aggregate that summarizes individual skills
in terms of productive capacity.7 The aggregation of individual skills into pro-





where Kj(t) is the productive capacity of a person if he works in country j
at time t, Ss(t) is the quantity of skill s possessed by the individual at time
t and ￿sj is a non-negative parameter that represents the contribution of skill
s to production in country j. We thus consider skills that are complements
in generating the human capital and allow the di⁄erent skills to have di⁄erent
productivity in di⁄erent countries. We refer to ￿sj as "prices" because, as we
shall show shortly, equilibrium wages are proportional to these productivity
factors.
5Learning as a joint production was ￿rst introduced by Rosen (1972a, 1972b). Willis and
Rosen (1979), Borjas (1987) and Heckman and Honore (1990) discuss the two skill Roy model.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) consider learning in stepping stone occupations. Borjas (1987)
and Gould and Moav (2008) use a two skill Roy model to explain emigration patterns but
they do not address learning and return migration.
6Earlier work (e.g., Cobb-Clark 1993) ￿nds limited evidence for a negative relationship
between the source country￿ s income inequality and emigrant wages, as predicted by the one-
skill model. Later studies (Feliciano, 2005, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005, Belot and Hatton,
2008, Chicquiar and Hanson, 2005) ￿nd no such relationship. The empirical ￿ndings seem
compatible with the one skill model only upon introducing additional assumptions, such as a
decline in migration costs with education.
7A human capital model with multiple skills was ￿rst considered by Welch (1969). Heckman
et al. (2006) use a two skill model to explain schooling and wages and provide evidence for
the importance of both cognitive and non cognitive skills for such outcomes.
4To simplify the exposition, we consider the case of only two countries, the
receiving country and the country of origin, denoted by a and b, respectively,
and two skills, denoted by 1 and 2. Each person is characterized by a bundle
of two latent skills and in each country there is some bivariate distribution of
these skills in the population.8 For any ￿xed price of skills, one can use a linear
transformation to translate the latent skills S1 and S2 that a worker possesses
to the potential productive capacities of the worker in each of the two countries,
lnKa and lnKb: We can thus describe a worker by the pair (Ka(t);Kb(t)) instead
of a pair of latent skills (S1(t);S2(t)).9
Skills are initially endowed and can then be augmented by acquiring work
experience. We consider here a "learning by doing" technology, whereby work in
country j augments skill s at a constant rate ￿sj per unit of time worked. Note
the joint production feature of this technology; working in any one country
j augments two skills that are potentially useful in both countries. However,
experience accumulated in country j may be more relevant to some particular
skill and the same skills may be valued di⁄erently in the two countries. In this
way, we obtain that work experience is transferable but not necessarily general.
We assume that skill 1 is more productive in the receiving country (country
a) than in the home country (country b) while skill 2 is more productive in
country b than in country a. That is,
￿1a > ￿1b;￿2b > ￿2a: (2)
We also assume that skill 1 is accumulated at a faster rate than skill 2 in the
receiving country, a, while skill 2 is accumulated more quickly than skill 1 in
the country of origin, b. That is,
￿1a > ￿2a;￿2b > ￿1b: (3)
Together, these two assumptions distinguish the two countries in terms of the
skills that are used and generated there. Think of country a to be more modern
(developed) than country b and suppose that skill 1 represents "managerial" or
"intellectual" skills and skill 2 represents "work" or "physical" skills. Then one
may expect that managerial skills have a higher relative price in the developed
country and also that work experience in the developed country will augment
this skill at a higher rate. In contrast, physical skills may be relatively more
valuable in country b and also augmented there at a faster rate.
We assume that ￿sj and ￿sj are all constant parameters and that time ￿ ows
continuously. Then, a person who works in country a accumulates local human
capital at a rate
_ Ka
Ka
= ￿1a￿1a + ￿2a￿2a ￿ gaa; (4)
8Individual skills cannot be unbundled from the worker and sold to di⁄erent employers. For
simplicity, we abstract here from the occupational assignment within countries and essentially
assume one occupation in each country.
9The maintained assumption here is that skills can be measured in some standard units
that are common to all countries. The coe¢ cients ￿sj can then be recovered, in principle,
from data on earnings (preferably of the same individuals), the duration of stay in the two
countries and the choices made by di⁄erent potential immigrants.
5and foreign human capital at a rate
_ Kb
Kb
= ￿1b￿1a + ￿2b￿2a ￿ gba: (5)




= ￿1b￿1b + ￿2b￿2b ￿ gbb; (6)
and foreign human capital at a rate
_ Ka
Ka
= ￿1a￿1b + ￿2a￿2b ￿ gab: (7)
As seen, the growth in local and foreign human capital for workers in each of the
two countries depends on both the prices and learning rates of the two skills.
Because prices of skills and the learning rates of each skill di⁄er between the
two countries, the rates of change in human capital that are applicable locally
or abroad can di⁄er.
2.2 Assumptions
For simplicity we assume certainty, in￿nitely long lived agents and a ￿xed in-
terest rate r. We further assume that learning can take place only for a ￿nite
period of time T. When an agent reaches that critical age her human capital
remains constant for the rest of her life, which captures the idea that learn-
ing capacity declines with age.10 This assumption implies substitution between
learning at home and abroad. The more time a person learns in the home coun-
try, the less time is left for learning abroad. Finally, we ignore costs of mobility
and non-wage rewards that of course can be important in practice. We do so
to focus on the learning issues which have not been investigated much in the
literature.11
Another simplifying assumption of our model, that is embedded in the linear
equations (4) to (7), is that the rates of growth of human capital of each type
are constant and thus independent of the initial endowments Ka(0) and Kb(0).
The independence assumption is in line with standard models of human capital
such as Rosen (1976) and Ben-Porath (1967). A basic feature of such models
is that human capital is self productive. Hence, a skilled person can learn more
than an unskilled person. In these models, the growth rate is also in￿ uenced by
individual decisions such as job switches or investment on the job.12 Concavity
10Empirically, most of the wage growth that can be attributed to work experience takes
place over the ￿rst ten years of the work career (see Rubinstein and Weiss, 2007).
11Selective out-migration and return migration can be in￿uenced by the costs of mobility,
especially if these costs di⁄er by level of schooling (see Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). Grogger
and Hanson (2008) estimate the costs of moving across di⁄erent countries and report fairly
large costs.
12For instance, Rosen (1976) speci￿es
_ K
K = h(s); where s is "time" or "e⁄ort" spent learning
on the job. Earnings are then w = RK(1 ￿ s); where r is the rental rate of human capital.
6of the earnings pro￿le is obtained by a reduction in investment over the life cy-
cle as the remaining time to use the investment shortens. However, the optimal
choice of the investment pro￿le is independent of history and K(0) in particu-
lar.13 In the model presented here, learning by doing occurs at a constant rate
as long as a person stays in a given country. However, behavior can in￿ uence
the growth of human capital by optimal switches across countries, which is very
similar to the switches across jobs discussed by Rosen (1972).
In this paper, we shall mainly focus on the degree to which experience ac-
quired in the receiving country, a, in￿ uences the earning capacity that an im-
migrant would have if she returns to the country of origin, b. We allow country
a to be a learning center in the sense that experience acquired there can aug-
ment earning capacity locally and in other countries in a substantive way. In
particular, we shall consider the case
gba > gaa > gbb; (8)
which means that experience acquired in the host country, a, can augment
the human capital that is applicable to the home country, b, by more than it
augments the human capital that is applicable to the host country and also by
more than one can obtain by staying in the home country. In contrast, country
b is not a learning center. We thus assume throughout that
gab < gbb < gaa (9)
and
gab < r < gba: (10)
Assumption (9) states that experience acquired in country b has only a moder-
ate e⁄ect on earning capacity, locally and abroad. Assumption (10) adds that
under these circumstances it is unpro￿table to delay a move from country b to
country a, because the growth rate in the human capital applicable to country
a, while staying in b, is below the interest rate. On the other hand, it may
be pro￿table to delay the move back from country a to country b, because the
growth rate in human capital that is applicable to country b, while staying in
a, exceeds the interest rate. Together, assumptions (8), (9) and (10) allow us
to consider emigration and return migration ￿ ows that are one directional from
the developing country b to the developed country a and back, but not the other
way around. Of course, the model is general enough to accommodate ￿ ows in
both directions and delayed migration, but we shall suppress these possibilities
here.
13The only di⁄erence is that for the Ben-Porath model _ k + ￿k is independent of k(0);while
in the Rosen model,
_ k
k is independent of k(0) (see Weiss, 1986). The reason for using these
speci￿c versions is their tractability. Independence of history allows explicit solutions for
the optimal investment and earning pro￿les that are not available otherwise. An important
illustration is Lucas (1988) who incorporates human capital into a growth model, using Rosen￿ s
speci￿cation.
72.3 Transferability
Regarding the e⁄ect of learning in country a on the earning capacity in country
b, we distinguish three basic cases.
1) Partial transferability of experience, gba < gbb, which means that by
staying in the home country, b, one can augment the human capital that is
applicable to the home country by more than if work experience is acquired
abroad in country a. Furthermore, having assumed that gbb < gaa, we also have
that gba < gaa. That is, experience acquired in the host country augments the
human capital applicable to the host country, Ka, by more than it augments
the human capital that is applicable to the home country, Kb.
2) Strong transferability, gba > gaa, which means that experience ac-
quired in the host country augments the human capital applicable to that coun-
try, Ka, by less than it augments the human capital that is applicable to the
home country, Kb. Furthermore, having assumed that gbb < gaa, we also have
that gba > gbb: That is, experience acquired in the host country augments the
human capital applicable to the home country, Kb, by more than one would
obtain by acquiring work experience in the home country.
3) Super transferability, gba > gaa (and thus gba > gbb) and also gba ￿
gbb > r: In this special case of strong transferability, the learning e⁄ects are
su¢ ciently strong to guarantee that, irrespective of the individual￿ s initial skills,
learning abroad dominates learning in the home country.
These de￿nitions do not apply directly to transferability of skills or pro-
ductive capacity but rather to the role of work experience in each country in
augmenting skills that have di⁄erent values in di⁄erent countries. The worker
can always keep the skills that are embodied in her but because these skills
are valued di⁄erently across countries, each person has two di⁄erent earnings
capacities, one for each country. The question then is how work experience in a
given country in￿ uences these two earnings capacities. It can be shown that all
the cases described above can be satis￿ed by appropriate choices of the basic
parameters of the model, that is, the four growth rates and the four prices of
skills in the two countries.14 This richness of possibilities arises because the
rates of augmentation of the earnings capacity in each of the two countries are
di⁄erent combinations of the skill acquisition rates and prices.
2.4 Rental rate of human capital and its adaptation
Firms in each country reward individual skills indirectly by renting human cap-
ital at the market-determined rental rate, Rj, implying that a worker with a
given bundle of skills earns in country j at time t




14For instance, for 4% < r < 12%, the parameters below satisfy super transferability.
country ￿1 ￿2 ￿1 ￿2 ga gb
a 2 1 5 4 14 21
b 1 4 1 2 4 9
8Thus, the parameter ￿sj is proportional to the increase in earning capacity
associated with a unit increase in skill s if the individual works in country j.
Having assumed that ￿sj is independent of the quantity of skill s possessed by
the individual, these coe¢ cients may be viewed as the implicit ￿ price￿(or ￿ rate
of return￿ ) of skill s in country j: We assume that the rental rate for human
capital in the receiving country, Ra, exceeds the rental rate that human capital
receives in country b, Rb: This di⁄erence in rental rates can be sustained if
country a has a superior technology and immigration into the receiving country
is regulated and only some of those who wish to enter are allowed in.
For several reasons, it is likely that immigrants who enter the receiving coun-
try do not immediately receive the same rental rate for their human capital as
natives. Firstly, it takes time for immigrants to ￿nd a suitable job that matches
their skills in the receiving country. Secondly, employers may be uncertain or
prejudiced about the immigrants￿quality and may update their beliefs based
on observed performance. Finally, immigrants may need time to learn the local
language and labor market institutions. To describe these processes, we adopt
the following functional form
~ Ra(t ￿ ￿) = e￿￿(t￿￿)Rb + (1 ￿ e￿￿(t￿￿))Ra; (12)
where ~ Ra is the rental rate for human capital that immigrants receive in country
a, and ￿ is the time of entry into the new country.15 That is, the rental rate
that an immigrant from country b receives in country a is a weighted average of
the rental rate in the country of origin, Rb, and the rental rate in the receiving
country, Ra. Initially, immigrants receive the same rental rate as abroad, Rb,
but as they spend more time in the host country, the rental rate rises and
approaches the rental rate of natives, Ra. The parameter ￿ > 0 controls the
speed of adjustment. With this speci￿cation, the gap in the rental rates of
natives and immigrants narrows at a decreasing rate with the duration of stay
in the host country.
By the same logic, the rental rate that potential immigrants from country
a to country b would receive in country b would be lower than that of natives,
Rb. Our model which allows for the case gba > gaa and provides incentives for
return migration of natives from the home country may also create incentives
for some natives of the host country to emigrate from country a to country b. To
simplify, we assume away such emigration by setting the rental rate in country
b for immigrants from country a to zero.
15Eckstein and Weiss (2004) have estimated the parameters of equation (12) and found that
immigrants from the former USSR to Israel, although being highly skilled, have initial wages
that are far below those of natives with comparable skills. Dustmann, Frattini and Hall (2009)
show that new immigrants to the UK from Eastern Europe, despite having much higher levels
of education than natives, start o⁄ with wages far lower than those of natives with comparable
levels of education. However, as they stay longer in the host country, their wages grow much
faster than those of natives.
93 The Return Decision
3.1 The costs and bene￿ts of delayed return
Imagine an immigrant who moved from country b to a at time ￿ and considers
whether to return to the home country at time ", where ￿ < " < T: Conditional
on entry at ￿, the present value (evaluated at the time of entry ￿) resulting from
staying at country a for a period " ￿ ￿ and then moving back to country b at
time " is
V (";￿) = Ka(￿)
" Z
￿







where Ka(￿) and Kb(￿) are the amounts of human capital applicable to countries
a and b, respectively, that the worker has upon arrival to the host country at
time ￿.
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ", we get







The ￿rst term on the RHS of (14) is the marginal gain from postponing the
return to the home country in terms of the current earnings in the receiving
country. The second term is the marginal cost of delay in terms of the current
earnings one may receive upon returning to the home country. The last term
is the marginal e⁄ect of postponement on life time earnings following the re-
turn to the home country which can be positive or negative, depending on the
acquisition rates of the human capital that is applicable to the home country,
Kb, in the two countries. If gba > gbb (that is, local human capital is more e¢ -
ciently acquired abroad) then a delay raises the amount of Kb that a returning
immigrant can acquire during the learning period T and can then use in coun-
try b. Conversely, if gba < gbb, a delayed return is costly in terms of acquiring
additional local capital during the remainder of the learning period from " to
T.
We can rewrite (14) as












is the marginal cost of delay per unit of human capital that is applicable to the
home country, Kb. The derivative of this cost with respect to " is given by




It is seen that if gba > gbb then C(") rises in ", reaching a maximum of 1￿
gba￿gbb
r
at " = T. Conversely, if gba < gbb then C(") declines in ", reaching a minimum
of 1 ￿
gba￿gbb
r at " = T.
Because learning cannot continue beyond time T, there is a discontinuity in
the marginal cost of delaying the return at T. For " > T, we have




Hence, by approaching T from above we get in the limit




However, from (15) and (16) we see that by approaching T from below we get
in the limit









r > 0, the marginal cost of delay jumps up and V"(T;￿) jumps
down at T while if
gba￿gbb
r < 0, the marginal cost of delay jumps down and
V"(T;￿) jumps up at T. Only if 0 =
gba￿gbb
r we have continuity.
We can now summarize the main forces that a⁄ect the return decisions. The
rising rental rate for human capital in the host country provides an incentive
to delay the return. When experience accumulated in the host country raises
the human capital applicable to the home country at a faster rate than it raises
the human capital applicable to the host country, i.e. gba > gaa, delay becomes
more costly because the only way to use the higher earning capacity in the home
country is to move there. However, when experience accumulated in the host
country raises the human capital applicable to the home country at a faster rate
than experience in the home country raises local human capital, i.e. gba > gbb,
there is an incentive to delay the return until T because the learning period is
￿nite and, conditioned on returning, learning abroad is more productive. The
interest rate also plays a role because, to the extent that investment abroad is
productive, one would prefer to receive these bene￿ts sooner rather than later.
For this reason, some individuals may prefer to return home prior to T, even
though gba > gbb: However, when gba ￿ gbb > r, all immigrants will spend the
11whole learning period T in the host country and then some of them will return
home.
While the marginal bene￿t from delay, ~ Ra(" ￿ ￿), is common to all im-
migrants, the marginal cost depends on the initial endowments that each im-
migrant possesses upon entry into the host country. An increase in the ratio
￿(￿) ￿
Kb(￿)
Ka(￿) shifts the marginal costs curve upwards, because then the foregone
earnings at home while learning abroad are higher at any point in time.
3.2 Time of return
We ￿rst note that returning after T is never optimal. For " > T, all learning
opportunities have already been exhausted and therefore, the costs of delay are
constant, while the marginal bene￿ts from delay continue to rise, as seen in
Figures 1 to 3. Hence, immigrants who have delayed their stay beyond T will
always stay longer (see also the on line Appendix). Having stayed in the host









and stay in the host country forever otherwise. Whether an immigrant will
actually stay forever, leave at T or leave before T depends on the transferability
of experience from the host to the home country. We thus consider three cases.
Partial transferability, gaa > gbb > gba In this case, the ratio
Kb(t)
Ka(t) declines
with the duration of stay in the host country and, therefore, the costs of delayed
return decline. That is, moving back to the home country becomes less attractive
if the emigrant has already stayed in the host country for a while. This is
illustrated in Figure 1. The rising concave curve represents the rental rate that
immigrants receive in country a, ~ Ra(" ￿ ￿), which is the marginal gain from
delaying the return to the home country. The downward sloping curve represents
the marginal cost in terms of forgone earnings in the home country associated
with a delayed return. The intersection of these marginal gain and marginal
cost curves determines the duration of stay in the host country that satis￿es the
￿rst order condition, V"(";￿) = 0. However, as seen in the Figure 1, the second
order condition is not satis￿ed at this point. Moving a bit to the right the
incentive to stay longer increases and moving a bit to the left the incentive to
stay is reduced. This is indicated by the arrows in Figure 1. Thus, depending
on their initial endowments, workers will either stay in the home country or
immigrate to the host country and never return. This result is the same as
the occupational specialization results under partial transferability obtained by
Weiss (1971).
Strong transferability, gba > gaa > gbb In this case, the ratio ￿(t) ￿
Kb(t)
Ka(t)
rises with the duration of stay in the host country. Therefore, the cost of a
12delayed return rises with the duration of stay in the host country. That is,
moving back to the home country becomes more attractive if the emigrant has
already stayed in the host country for a while. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
In this case, if an intersection exists for ", such that ￿ < " < T, it satis￿es the
second order conditions. Therefore, an optimal solution may exist such that an
immigrant who entered the receiving country will later choose to return to the
home country. This happens, because during the stay in the host country, the
human capital applicable in the home country, Kb, rises at a faster rate than the
human capital that is applicable to the host country, Ka. Examining Figure 2,
it is seen that immigrants with a higher ￿(￿) will leave sooner after arrival (i.e.,
"￿￿ declines) because the foregone earnings at home while learning abroad are
higher for them. For su¢ ciently low ￿(￿), the cost function will shift down and
the intersection will occur in the range in which " > T, but then an intersection
does not satisfy the second order conditions and, based on condition (21), the
immigrant either leaves at T or stay forever.
Super transferability, gba > gaa > gbb and gba ￿ gbb > r In this case, the
marginal costs of delay in terms of forgone earnings in the home country become
negative for all " < T, irrespective of the initial skill endowments. Because of
the positive bene￿ts from delayed return associated with the rising rental rate,
~ Ra(" ￿ ￿), all immigrants will stay until T. Then, based on condition (21) the
immigrant either leaves at T or stay forever. This case is illustrated in Figure
3.
4 Who Returns and Who Leaves
In the on line Appendix, we show that in all the considered cases, immigrants
who choose to emigrate will do it at time ￿ = 0. The basic intuition is that if
the immigrant plans to stay in the host country, then, by leaving early, she can
increase the amount of Ka that will be used in the host country. Similarly, if
the immigrant plans to return to the home country she can increase, by leaving
early, the amount of Kb that will be used in the home country. In either case,
the limited learning period is used more e¢ ciently by an early exit.
In our model immigrants are forward looking and take their prospective
return decisions into account. Individuals with di⁄erent initial endowments of
the two skills, S1(0) and S2(0), make di⁄erent emigration decisions that depend
on the prices and the learning rates of the two skills in the host and the home
country. Generally, individuals with a relatively higher endowment of the skill
that is more highly rewarded in the home country (skill 2) are more likely to stay
in the home country and those individuals with a relatively higher endowment
of the skill that has a higher value in the host country (skill 1) are more likely
to emigrate. However, the precise determination of these groups depends on
whether emigrants plan to return or not and when. We shall therefore discuss
the three basic cases outlined above separately.
134.1 Partial Transferability, gaa > gbb > gba
We have shown that, in this case, an immigrant will either stay forever or leave
immediately at time 0. The choice between these two alternatives is reduced
to a comparison of the potential life time earnings in the two countries and a















Recalling our de￿nition, ￿(t)￿
Kb(t)
Ka(t), this comparison of present values can be




e(gaa￿r)t ~ Ra(t)dt + e(gaa￿r)T
1 R
0







Thus, there is some critical value of ￿(0) denoted as ￿p that triggers emigration.
We emphasize that ￿p (as well as the trigger values de￿ned below) is not an
additional independent parameter. Rather, it is an endogenously determined
function of the basic parameters that summarizes the impact of planned future
immigration decisions on the present value of life time earnings that is associated
with alternative current choices. For instance, an increase in Ra relative to Rb
raises ￿p, which induces a larger proportion of the population to emigrate and
never return.








Because ~ Ra(t) > Rb and gaa > gbb, the expected earnings per unit of initial
human capital are higher in country a than in country b and, therefore, ln￿p >
0. Di⁄erent individuals have di⁄erent skills and the set of people that wish to
emigrate is all those whose bundle of initial skills (a pair (S1(0);S2(0)) places
them below the bold line described in Figure 4. Because skill 1 has higher
value in country a, individuals with relatively higher endowment of that skill
are more likely to emigrate. The slope of the boundary line is ￿1a￿￿1b
￿2b￿￿2a which,
under our assumptions, is positive but can be above or below 1.16 The graph

















14is drawn for the case in which the prices of skill 2 di⁄er across countries less
than the prices of skill 1, that is, ￿1a￿￿1b
￿2b￿￿2a > 1. This condition can be compared
to the one skill model of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) by examining the special
case of perfect correlation between the two skills, S = S1(0)= S2(0): Then the
condition ￿1a￿￿1b
￿2b￿￿2a > 1 implies that
dlnKa
dS
=￿1a + ￿2a >
dlnKb
dS
=￿1b + ￿2b: (25)
That is, a common increase in both skills raises log earnings in country a by
more than it increases log of earnings in country b. Hence, in the one skill model
individuals with low S would prefer to stay in the home country, while those
with high S will emigrate. In the two dimensional case discussed here, the two
skills are not perfectly correlated. Therefore, although ￿1a￿￿1b
￿2b￿￿2a > 1; some of
those who choose to stay in the home country are more "able" (in the sense
of having a higher endowment of both skills) than some of those who choose
to emigrate. This is illustrated by points a and b in Figure 4. At the same
time, some of those who choose to stay in the home country are less "able" (in
the sense of having a lower endowment of both skills) than some of those who
choose to emigrate. This is illustrated by points c and d in Figure 4. It is only
if we restrict attention to comparisons along lines with a slope of 1 that all the
individuals who emigrate are more able than all the individuals who stay. In
this regard, the two dimensional model provides a richer set of possibilities than
the one dimensional model.
4.2 Strong Transferability, gba > gaa > gbb
In this case, some individuals may stay in the home country, some may emigrate
and return at some " between 0 and T and some will emigrate and never return.
Individuals for whom V"(0;0) < 0 will stay in the home country; they do not
want to leave at time 0 nor do they want to exit later, as we show in the
appendix. Individuals for whom V"(0;0) > 0, will emigrate and stay in the host
country at least some time. By (15) and (16),
























e￿r(t￿T) ~ Ra(t)dt ￿ ￿nr; (28)




will return to the home country return some time before T.
The case with C(0) > 0 and ￿s > ￿nr is presented in Figure 5.17 The
population is then divided into three groups. Those with high initial endow-
ment of the skill that is highly valued in country b; S1(0) relative to to their
endowment of the skill that is highly valued in country a; S2(0); will stay in
the home country. The others will emigrate and, among them, those for whom
S1(0) is high relatively to S2(0) will stay in the host country for good. The
solid boundary lines are now drawn with a slope that is less than 1, which is a








Would we restrict ourselves to the one dimensional case, as in Borjas and
Bratsberg (1996), this requirement would imply that all individuals who stay
in the home country are more able than all immigrants that return who are in
turn more able than all immigrants who stay abroad. This seems implausible
in the case of immigration from developing countries to a developed country. In
this regard, a two skill model is much more appealing, because it allows a richer
set of possibilities.
4.3 Super Transferability, gba > gaa > gbb and gba ￿ gbb > r
In this case, all immigrants stay in the host country until T and then some
return, at T, to the home country and others stay permanently. Those who go
























Thus, C(0) > 0 if gba￿gbb is small or if the learning period T is short and C(0) < 0
otherwise. If C(0) < 0; the top region in Figure 5 disappears.




e￿rt+gaat ~ Ra(t)dt + Ka(0)e(gaa￿r)T
1 Z
T
e￿r(t￿T) ~ Ra(t)dt: (32)




e￿rt+gbbtdt + e(gbb￿r)T RbKb(0)
r
: (33)
We can show that, under our assumption that gba ￿ gbb > r; everyone will
want to emigrate, because going abroad and returning always dominates staying
at home. That is, even if one earns nothing abroad, the increase in earning
capacity after the completion of training abroad more than compensates for the
forgone earnings at home during the training period, T.18
As it does not make sense that everyone can enter the host country, imag-
ine that the government of the receiving country restricts entry by requiring a
minimal level of skill 1 which, by assumption, is more valuable in country a.
Then, those with lower endowment of skill 1 than the minimal required value,
given by Sm
1 (0), must stay in the home country and the rest are divided ac-
cording to the shaded areas indicated in Figure 6.19 For those who are allowed
in, there is a critical value such that emigrants with
Kb(0)
Ka(0) > ￿r(0) will choose
to return to the home country at time T (because for them Wr(T) > Ws(T)),
while those for whom
Kb(0)
Ka(0) < ￿r(0) will stay in the host country (because for








Every immigrant with a bundle of skills above the positively sloped solid line
in Figure 6 will return to the home country and all others will stay in the host
country.20 The boundary is drawn again with a slope less than 1, as implied by
strong transferability, which also applies here.
18To see that, we write
Wr(T) ￿ Wh(T) > f(T) ￿
RbKb(0)
r












[gba ￿ r ￿ gbb] > 0:
This implies that, for every T > 0, f(T) > 0 and Wr(T) > Wh(T):
19Such a restriction is analyzed by Djajic (1989) in a one skill framework.
20The intercept is taken here to be negative, which would be the case if ￿ is su¢ ciently
small. For a large ￿, the intercept can be positive.
175 Closing the model
We described here the immigration and remigration decisions of workers in a
developing country, taking as given the rental rates of human capital in the two
countries, Ra and Rb. These two parameters respond to changes in demand
and supply of labor and to the immigration policy of the receiving country. A
simple way to close the model is to postulate an aggregate production function
Yj = Fj(Nj;Hj); (35)
where Yj is the aggregate output of a single (composite) good in country j, Nj is
the aggregate physical (non human) capital employed in country j and Hj is the
aggregate human capital embodied in the population of country j. Assuming
a constant return to scale technology and free mobility of capital, the capital







) = r; (36)
where r is the internationally determined return to capital. Having a ￿xed capi-
tal labor ratio in each country, the rental rates for human capital Ra and Rb are
also uniquely determined. A di⁄erence between the two countries in the rental
rates of human capital resulting from di⁄erent technologies can be sustained if
mobility of workers is restricted. If some workers move from country b to coun-
try a then, depending on the initial skills of these workers, there is a certain
proportional increase in Ha and a certain proportional decrease in Hb. Following
the adjustments in non human capital the aggregate output in each country, Yj,
will change by the same proportions as the change in aggregate human capital.
Finally, we can translate these results into a per capita framework by rewriting
the production function (35) as yj = Fj(nj;hj); where yj is per capita income
in country j, nj is the per capita physical (non human) capital employed in
country j, and hj is the per capita human capital embodied in the population
of country j.21
6 Brain Gain and Brain Drain
We ￿rst observe that in the absence of externalities, individual rationality im-
plies that the reduction in local output caused by emigration is always lower
than the gain that the immigrant obtains abroad. Hence, there is always a po-
tential gain for the developing countries if their citizens can apply their skills
where they receive the highest rewards. However, in the absence of transfers,
emigration can have negative e⁄ects on those who remain behind, workers as
21This simple analysis is completely static. Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) provide a dy-
namic analysis in which migration and return migration generate technological di⁄usion that
a⁄ects the rate of growth in the receiving and sending countries. Business cycle e⁄ects can
also be added by letting the rental rates in the two countries vary with the cycle.
18well as capital owners, through changes in factor prices or a reduced tax base
and ability to ￿nance local public goods. It was therefore suggested that emi-
grants, or the receiving developed countries, should compensate the developing
countries for these losses (see Bagwhati 1976, Part I). In practice, such taxation
is hard to accomplish and we shall be concerned here only with the proportional
change in local per capita human capital caused by emigration and return mi-
gration, which under our assumptions is the same as the proportional change in
local per capita income. We refer to a reduction in the per capita human capital
in the home country (country b) as a brain drain and to an increase in the per
capita human capital in the home country as a brain gain.
Consider the following thought experiment. Initially, there is no labor mobil-
ity between countries. Then, at a later time, costless labor migration becomes
feasible. We wish to examine the implications of such a change for the developing
country (country b). We have seen that with partial transferability emigrants
from country b to country a do not return to their home country. Therefore, in
this case, local aggregate output must decline. However, output per capita in
the home country may increase if the skill composition of emigrants is such that
per capita endowment of human capital hb rises.22 If experience acquired in the
host country is strongly transferable, some immigrants return and some stay,
but because immigrants with di⁄erent initial skills return at di⁄erent times it
is hard to evaluate the aggregate outcome. However, with super transferabil-
ity, all immigrants that return will do so at the end of the learning period, T.










which is always positive under super transferability (see footnote 18). On the
other hand, there may be a per capita gain or loss from those who leave and
do not return. The brain gain (loss) from any emigrant that does not return
is determined by comparing his potential life time earnings if he would have





r ], to the
average life time earnings prior to emigration. Taking all these possibilities into
account, output per capita in the home country can increase if the proportion
of returning immigrants is large enough, thus leading to a brain gain.
To the extent that the host country imposes an entry skill standard, the
probabilities of exit and return must also be conditioned on having the minimal
level of S1(0) required for entry. By imposing such a standard, the home country
"gains" some of those who have low levels of skill 1 and would not have returned
22This will happen if the average skills of the stayers is higher than the population mean.
Assuming that skills are distributed in the population according to a joint normal distribution,
this will occur if the variance of Kb (in the home country) exceeds the covariance between Ka
and Kb. However, if the inequality is reversed, emigration will reduce the average per capita
endowment of human capital. See also Heckman and Honore (1990) and Borjas (1987).
19(because they have relatively low amounts of the local skill, 2) but it "loses"
those with low levels of skill 1 who would have returned to the home country
with their augmented local skills that they would have acquired abroad. The
second group may be more valuable to the home country if their weight among
unaccepted immigrants is substantial. Hence, it is quite possible that by im-
posing a skill standard the brain drain problem faced by the home country will
be aggravated. Moreover, from the point of view of the receiving country, the
selection by local skill restricts entry of immigrants who would return to their
home country anyway, which may not be the intended outcome of the policy.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a tractable model that focuses on the incentives to return
immigration based on investment considerations.23 It was shown that, under
some conditions, the model can generate a brain gain. The basic idea is that
some countries are learning centers where one can learn skills more e⁄ectively,
including skills that are applicable to the home country. Therefore, some in-
dividuals who emigrate will return to apply their acquired skills in the home
country. Moreover, those who return have a relatively high endowment of the
skill that is more valued in the home country.
We have extended the work of Borjas (1987) by adding learning consider-
ations to the Roy model. This richer framework has the potential to explain
migration and remigration patterns between developed and less developed coun-
tries that di⁄er in technology and industrial structure. An empirical application
of such a model requires measures of the various dimensions of skills. School-
ing alone is insu¢ cient for this purpose but one can add the "task content" of
occupations as in Autor and Handel (2009).
We discussed here only learning by doing on the job. However, the basic
ideas also apply to learning at school. A policy issue that applies to both cases
is how to allocate the gains from immigration among individuals and in between
countries. Tuition policies in the context of student migration are discussed
in Rosenzweig (2006) and Kennan (2009). This problem is somewhat more
complicated in the case of learning on the job, where the opportunity costs are
not directly observable. Further issues arise if one can move to a learning center
in order to acquire skills that are applicable in a third country rather than the
home country, resulting in chain migration. In this case, the natural solution
would be to require a payment from the immigrant for the "general" human
capital that she acquired. Finally, an important issue that we did not discuss
is the potential externalities if the skills of di⁄erent workers in a given economy
are complements. Hence, brain drain or gain can have magni￿ed consequences
23Other reasons for return migration and their implications, such as consumption prefer-
ences, retirement, and purchasing power di⁄erences are discussed elsewhere (Dustmann, 1995,
Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). Business cycle e⁄ects are discussed in Mandelman and
Zlade (2008).
20through the impacts of emigration (immigration) on the workers who stay in
the home country and also further consequences for the workers in the receiving
country.
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Figure 1: Determination of time in the host country, partial transferability

























Figure 2: Determination of time in the host country, strong transferability


























Figure 3: Determination of time in the host country, super transferability
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Figure 4: Determination of who emigrates, partial transferability
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Figure 5: Emigration and return migration, strong transferability
296
6:pdf
Figure 6: Emigration and return migration, super transferability
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Appendix.
Christian Dustmann, Itzhak Fadlon and Yoram Weiss
1A p p e n d i x
This appendix shows that under the assumptions given in the text, an immigrant
will leave the host country no later than the end of the learning period, T, and
will leave the home country at the earliest possible time, t =0 .
1.1 Return after T
We ﬁrst show that time of return to the home country is such that ε ≤ T.
To show that, consider an immigrant who plans to extend his stay in the host
country beyond T and then to return home at some time ε>T . The present








Vε(ε,T)=Ka(T)e−r(ε−T) ˜ Ra(ε − τ) − RbKb(T)e−r(ε−T) (2)
= e−r(ε−T)[Ka(T) ˜ Ra(ε − τ) − RbKb(T)],
and
Vεε(ε,T)=−rVε(ε,T)+e−r(ε−T)Ka(T)λ[Ra − ˜ Ra(ε − τ)]. (3)
Because the rental rate that immigrants receive in the host country, ˜ Ra(ε −τ),
is always below the rental rate that natives receive, Ra,w eo b t a i nf r o m( 3 )
that Vε(ε,T)=0⇒ Vεε(ε,T) > 0 for any ﬁnite ε. Hence, there is no internal
solution for ε that exceeds T a n dap o t e n t i a li m m i g r a n tw o u l de i t h e rl e a v ea t
T (or earlier) or stay in the host country forever, depending upon where the
present value of subsequent earnings is higher. This rule applies whether or
not the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal beneﬁt curve in the region
ε>T.
11.2 Leaving at time τ =0
W en o ws h o wt h a te a r l ye x i ta tτ =0is always optimal. We ﬁrst show τ>T
cannot be optimal. Assume, to the contrary, that τ>T .Then, as we have
shown above, the immigrant will either move back home country instantaneously
(which is equivalent to staying in the home country) or stay at the host country
















e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt}. (5)
The sign of W0(τ) is seen to be independent of τ and, therefore, the immigrant
will either never leave (if W0(τ) > 0) or leave immediately at T if (if W0(τ) < 0).
We can further show that, for an immigrant who plans to leave the source
country b at τ = T and stay in the host country, it is always preferable to leave
the home country somewhat earlier. To s e et h i s ,e x a m i n et h el i f et i m ev a l u eo f











e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt, (6)
and




+(gab − gaa − r)Ka(0)egabτ+gaa(T−τ)−rτ
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt. (7)
So that
W0(T)=e−rT{RbKb(T)+( gab − gaa − r)Ka(T)
∞ Z
0
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt}. (8)
2Now, if the immigrant emigrates at T,it must be the case that the present value






e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt. (9)
Also, under our asymmetry assumption (9), one acquires Ka i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y
at a lower rate than in the host country, gab <g aa. Therefore, W0(T) < 0. In
other words, if a worker plans a "ﬁnal" move to country a he would increase the
amount of Ka(T) that will be used for the remainder of the work life by moving
slightly earlier than the end of the learning period, T. We show below that an
interior solution with respect to τ does not exist in the range 0 <τ<T.Hence,
given that W0(T) < 0, the only corner solution is at τ =0 .
We conduct the analysis for the case 0 <τ<Tseparately for the three
types of transferability.
1.2.1 Partial Transferability
We have shown in the text that, in this case, an immigrant who leaves the home
country will never return. Therefore, the present value of life time earnings
(evaluated at time 0) of a migrant who moves from the home country to the











e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt. (10)
and




(gab − gaa − r)Ka(0)egaa(T−τ)
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt}, (11)
W00(τ)=( gab − r)W0(τ)+e(gab−r)τ{(gbb − gab)RbKb(0)e(gbb−gab)τ
−gaa(gab − gaa − r)Ka(0)egaa(T−τ)
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt (12)
−gaae−r(T−τ) ˜ Ra(T − τ)Ka(0)egaa(T−τ)}.
3Using integration by parts of
∞ R
T−τ
−re−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt, the sum of the two last
terms in the curled brackets in (11) can be rewritten as
−gaa(gab − gaa − r)Ka(0)egaa(T−τ)
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt − gaae−r(T−τ) ˜ Ra(T − τ)Ka(0)egaa(T−τ)
= −gaaKa(0)egaa(T−τ)[(gab − gaa)
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt − r
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt + e−r(T−τ) ˜ Ra(T − τ)]
= −gaaKa(0)egaa(T−τ)[(gab − gaa)
∞ Z
T−τ






Having assumed that gab <g bb <g aa and
d ˜ Ra(t)
dt > 0, we see that W0(τ) ≤ 0= ⇒
W00(τ) > 0. Hence, there is no interior solution for τ in the interval (0,T).G i v e n
our result that W0(T) < 0, it must then be the case that W0(τ) < 0 for all τ
such that 0 <τ<T,implying τ =0 .
1.2.2 Strong Transferability
We have shown in the text that, in this case, an immigrant may return to the
home country at some time ε such that τ<ε≤ T. Therefore, the present value
of life time earnings (evaluated at time 0) of a migrant who moves from the

































4Using the envelope theorem,










which, evaluated at the optimum of ε − τ, yields







(τ)=( gbb − r)W0(τ) (17)




+(gab − r)Ka(0)e(gab−gbb)τe(gaa−r)(ε−τ) ˜ Ra(ε − τ)
d(ε − τ)
dτ
−(gba − r)RbKb(0)e(gba−r)(ε−τ)d(ε − τ)
dτ
}.





sumed that gbb >g ab it follows that ε declines in τ and, therefore, ε−τ declines
in τ. We conclude that for gab <r<g ba,W 0(τ)=0= ⇒ W00(τ) > 0. This
also holds if the immigrant’s optimal choice is to return at T in which case
d(ε−τ)
dτ = −1. Hence, there is no interior solution for τ in the region (0,T).
Having shown that W0(T) < 0, the only possible corner is at τ =0 . That is, a
worker in country b who plans to emigrate and return at some ε p r i o rt oo ra tT
will emigrate immediately. For those who plan to stay in the host country, the
results in the previous subsection continue to hold and they too will emigrate
immediately.
1.2.3 Super Transferability
We have shown in the text that, in this case, all immigrants that return will will
do so at time T.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fl i f et i m ee a r n i n g s( e v a l u a t e da t
5time 0) of a migrant who moves from the home country to the receiving country
































We now need to consider two branches; the ﬁrst one, denoted by W1(τ),r e p -
resents the case in which conditioned on τ, the immigrant returns to the home
country and the second one, denoted by W2(τ), represents the case in which











and for gab <rand gba − gbb >r ,w eh a v et h a t
W0
1(τ)=RbKb(0)e(gbb−r)τ +( gab − r)e(gab−r)τKa(0)
T−τ Z
0
e(gaa−r)x ˜ Ra(x)dx − (20)















e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt, (21)
6and
W0




+e−rτKa(0)egabτ+gaa(T−τ)(gab − gaa − r)
∞ Z
T−τ
e−rt ˜ Ra(t)dt. (22)
















e−rt+gaat ˜ Ra(t)dt (24)




Thus, assuming that gab <r ,as u ﬃcient condition for W0
2(τ) to be negative is
re(gaa−gba)(T−τ)er(T−τ) + egaa(T−τ)(gab − gaa − r) < 0, (25)
or
gaa − gab + r>r e (r−gba)(T−τ),
which always holds given our assumptions that gab <g bb <g aa and gba−gbb >r .
Hence, in this case too, any person that emigrates does so at time 0. However,
the motives for this behavior are diﬀerent in the two cases. Those who return
wish to increase their local capital and if gba >g bb the gain is maximized by
going abroad as early as possible. In contrast, those who do not return wish to
increase their capital abroad and if gaa >g ab this is maximized by going abroad
as soon as possible.
7Ro b u s t n e s s , An Al t e r n a t i ve Mo d e l
1.1 Assumptions
A crucial aspect of our model is that each country is characterized by two
parameters, the learning rate of each skill and the prices of skills. A version
of our model with a concave learning curve that maintains this basic feature is
described below.
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fs k i l ls in country j at time t is
˙ Ss(t)=γsjh0(t), (1)
where h(t) is common to all countries and skills. This "learning curve" is as-
sumed to satisfy






We shall also assume here that life is of ﬁnite duration, T,and that the rental
rate of human capital is the same in the two countries, ˜ Ra(t−τ)=Ra = Rb.W e











= Kj(0) + h(t)gjj,
where gij are the same constants as in our paper.
2 Determination of the return and exit times
Let us consider a person who ﬁrst spent time in country b, then moved to country
a at time τ, and then returned to the home country b for the rest of his/her life.




e−rt(Kb(0) + h(t)gbb)dt + Ra
Z ε
τ




[Kb(ε)+( h(t) − h(ε))gbb]e−rtdt, (5)
1where
Ka(τ)=Ka(0) + gabh(τ),
Kb(ε)=Kb(0) + gbbh(τ)+gba(h(ε) − h(τ)).
Hence,















e−rtdt − Rbh0(ε)(gba − gbb)e−r(T−ε)}.
2.1 Partial Transferability
We see that, under the assumptions of partial transferability (gba <g bb and
gba <g aa ) and concavity of h(t),
Vε =0= ⇒ Vεε > 0. (8)
That is, a potential emigrant either leaves at τ and stays abroad until T or does
not leave at all (see Weiss 1971).
We can now further show that, in this case and provided a person emigrates,
it is optimal to leave immediately. An immigrant who leaves at τ and remains




















e−rtdt − Ra(gab − gaa)h0(τ)e−r(T−τ)}.
2We see again that under partial transferability (gba <g bb and gba <g aa)a n d
assuming concavity of h(t)
Vτ(T,τ)=0= ⇒ Vττ(T,τ) > 0. (12)
Hence, there is no interior solution for τ and those who choose to leave would









To motivate return migration, we shall assume strong transferability (gba >g bb
and gba >g aa), in which case it is seen from (7) that
Vε =0= ⇒ Vεε < 0 (14)
and an interior solution for ε may exist.
We shall now provide suﬃcient conditions which ensure that all potential
immigrants leave the home country at time τ =0 , and then some return to the
home country and some stay in the host country for the rest of their lives.





















e−rtdt − Rah0(τ)(gab − gaa)e−r(T−τ)}.
It is seen that under strong transferability Vτ =0= ⇒ Vττ > 0. Hence, there
is no interior solution with respect to τ in this case. With some additional
assumptions, it can be shown that the same result holds also when there is an
interior solution for ε and the immigrant returns at some ε∗ <T.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the present value of life time earnings (evaluated at time 0)o fa ni m m i g r a n t





e−rt(Kb(0) + h(t)gbb)dt + Ra
Z ε∗(τ)
τ




{Kb(ε∗(τ)) + [h(t) − h(ε∗(τ))]gbb}e−rtdt. (18)




















Diﬀerentiating again with respect to τ we obtain
d2V (ε∗(τ),τ)
dτ2 = −rV ∗



















and after rearranging terms we get
d2V (ε∗(τ),τ)
dτ2 = −rV ∗













− 1)h0(τ)[(gab − gaa)+( gba − gbb)]}.
To calculate
d(ε∗(τ))
dτ , we use the the implicit function theorem. Recalling that
at an interior optimum
4Vε(ε∗(τ),τ)=e−rε∗











h0(τ){(gab − gaa)+( gba − gbb)}
−Vεε(ε∗,τ)
. (23)
S i n c ew eh a v es h o w ne a r l i e rt h a tVε =0= ⇒ Vεε < 0, the sign of this derivative
is determined by (gab − gaa)+( gba − gbb). Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for
d(ε∗(τ))





dτ2 > 0, (24)
implying that there is no interior solution for τ. This means that individuals
either leave immediately at τ =0or never leave and τ = T. Examining the ﬁrst
order condition (16) we see that strong transferability (gba >g bb and gaa >g ab)
implies that
dV (ε∗(0),0)
dτ < 0 if h0(0) = ∞, so that leaving immediately at τ =0
is the optimal policy for everyone who leaves.
Having shown that those who choose to leave will do so immediately, the set
of movers is determined by the requirement
V (ε∗,0) = Ra
Z ε∗
0
(Ka(0) + h(t)gaa)e−rtdt + Rb
Z T
ε∗




(Kb(0) + h(t)gbb)e−rtdt (25)
and the subset of movers who do not return are those for whom ε∗ = T.
2.3 Super Transferability and Brain Gain
Finally, it can be shown that under strong transferability everyone who leaves
the home country and returns after spending some period ε∗ abroad, raises the
average amount of human capital in the home country if h0(0) is suﬃciently
large. To see this, note that there exists an ˆ ε such that a returning immigrant
w i l lp r o d u c ee x a c t l yt h es a m eo u t p u tw h e t h e rh es t a y si nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yo r
leaves and returns to the home country after a period ˆ ε<T .T h a t i s , t h e r e




(Kb(0) + h(t)gbb)e−rtdt = Rb
Z T
ε




[Kb(0) + h(ε)gba +( h(t) − h(ε))gbb]e−rtdt.
5The RHS of (26) is a function of ε which equals the LHS of (26) if ε =0and
equals 0 if ε = T. Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for an interior ˆ ε that satisﬁes
(26) is that the derivative of the RHS evaluated at ε =0is positive. The
derivative is given by








e−rtdt > Kb(0). (28)
As u ﬃcient condition for (28) to hold for any ﬁnite Kb(0) is h0(0) = ∞.N o w
because ε∗ is the optimal choice, it must be the case that
Z ε∗
0
Ra(Ka(0) + h(t)gaa)e−rtdt + Rb
Z T
ε∗




Ra(Ka(0) + h(t)gaa)e−rtdt + Rb
Z T
ˆ ε




Rb(Kb(0) + h(t)gbb)e−rtdt. (29)




e−rtdt > c, (30)
where c is some positive constant. Then, all potential immigrants with Kb(0) <c
will spend at least some time abroad. Of those, all the returnees generate a brain
gain. The gain arises because learning abroad dominates learning at home and
it is large enough to oﬀset the costs of lost local output during the immigrant’s
stay abroad. Note that condition (30) contains the same ingredients as our
deﬁnition of super transferability in the paper. In both cases, the diﬀerence
in the growth of Kb in country a and country b m u s tb el a r g er e l a t i v et ot h e
interest rate.
2.4 Discontinuity
A general feature of the learning by doing models (see Rubinstein and Weiss
2007, section 3.6) is the jump in the level of earnings as one moves from one
country to the other. The basic reason is that there is a trade-oﬀ between the
level of earnings and its growth. Looking at the ﬁrst order condition for the
return time ε, we see that at the optimum
Vε(ε∗,τ)=e−rε∗





6Thus, under strong transferability (gba >g bb), earnings at home upon return,
RbKb(ε∗), must be higher than earnings abroad upon exit, RaKa(ε∗).A t t h e
switch, there is a positive jump in the level of earnings because the growth of
Kb is higher abroad than in the home country.
7